To get our target for Independent of West Papua so we preparing Guerrilla Warfare in the Political Wing and Military Wing.
In Political Wing we established West Papua Liberation Organization (WPLO) and in Military Wing we established West Papua National Liberation Army (WPNLA). The chart of Guerrilla Warfare Leadership in West Papua like shown in this Organization Chart below:
John Anari West Papua Liberation Organization (WPLO) Jembatan Pasir Putih, Manokwari – West Papua. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org, URL: www.oppb.org
Abstract: West New Guinea is the Western part of the island in South Pacific Ocean where in Eastern part independent as Papua New Guinea under British administration but in the Western part under Dutch Administration since 24th August 1828 to 1 October 1962 as Non Self Governing Territory according to UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/448 (V) and transferred to Indonesia since 1 May 1963 through United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, UNTEA. So, this article will tell about the truth of the Status Quo of West New Guinea Under Administration of Dutch, UNTEA and Indonesia because Indonesia never continue to process UNGA Resolution A/RES/448 (V) but made Recolonization in New Guinea.
Keyword: Decolonization, Recolonization, Resolution, Agreements, Papua, Melanesia, Indonesia, Dutch, USA, UNTEA.
New Guinea is the second largest island in the World after Greenland, this island separated by Colonialist of British and Dutch into two regions that is Western part and Eastern part. In the Eastern part occupied by British in 1828 and they called British Papua but today got independent in 1975 as Papua New Guinea Country. In the Western part occupied by Dutch in 1828 and the called Netherlands New Guinea.
Dutch and British controlled New Guinea Island until April 1942 then they was attacked by Japanese in the Northern part of the island from Netherlands New Guinea to British Papua. Japanese take over them out but in the Southern Japanese not attack because the base of Allies in Australia.
Japanese controlled Northern part until they attack US Military base in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii on December 7, 1941 finally US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared war after one day of Japanese attack December 8, 1941. Under Commander of General Douglas McArthur US Army and join Force of United Kingdom, France and Netherlands they attack back Japan get out from Northern of New Guinea until in West New Guinea in Hollandia or now called Jayapura on April 22, 1942. Join Force of Allies made their base in Mountain Ifar at Hollandia. After Allies occupied Hollandia and established McArthur Fort then gave the administration to Dutch Kingdom under Temporary Governor of Netherlands New Guinea Inspector Police J.P. Van Echoud and Allies Forces continue pushed back Japanese out from Sarmi, Biak, Numfoor, Manokwari, Babo, Fakfak, Sorong and Sausapor in July 31, 1942. In Sausapor US’ Allies established Air Force Base to support attacked in Morotai at Halmahera Island and continue to Philippine. When the Fort of World World Two established in the Headquarter of Allies Force in Ifar Mount, General Douglas McArthur made a Statement that said “After this War, All Pacific Region as Non Self Governing must be processed by their Administrator to be had Self Government”.
For preparation West New Guinea to have Self Government or Independent, so Dutch took some Indonesian from jail in South of Merauke and Australia to helped Dutch to setup the Government of West New Guinea but the Indigenous against Indonesian because made them as third class after Dutch and Indonesian. So, Dutch established a school of Civil Service and appointed Javanese Indonesian Mr. Sugoro Admoprasodjo as the Director of that School to produced some Papuan as the leader to arranged their island as Non Self Governing Territory to Self-Government and Independent by them self. But suddenly, Mr. Sugoro made underground movement after the Japanese was attacked by atomic Bomb and Indonesia has been proclaimed their independent in August 17, 1945 so Mr. Sugoro arranged some his students to setup movement thus they called Ikut Indonesia Anti Netherlands, IRIAN. IRIAN is Follow Indonesia Reject Netherlands and ask Mr. Lukas Rumkorem as the chairman of IRIAN . They raised Indonesia’s flag in the School on August 30, 1945 so Dutch Government jailed Sugoro back to the prison in Merauke at Buven Digul but someone help him to let him run out to Papua New Guinea then Australia and arrived in Indonesia. After proclamation of independent of Indonesia August 17th, 1945 then Indonesia Council that they called The Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Indonesian: Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia ), (Japanese: 独立準備調査会 Dokuritsu Junbi Chōsa-kai) made the Session to discussed their territory on August 18th, 1945 and the Council declared that “Indonesia’s territories consist of Big Sunda Plate and Small Sunda Plate where Big Sunda consist of Sumatera, Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Small Sunda consist of Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Bali and Moluccas”. Their Council decided like that because the members of their Council consist of 12 Javanese, 3 Sumatrans, 1 Kalimantan, 2 Sulawesi, 1 Nusa Tenggara, 1 Moluccan and 1 Chinese. It’s clear that West New Guinea was not a part of Sunda Plate but New Guinea and Australia was a part of Sahul Plate Continent. So, Netherlands New Guinea was prepared by Dutch to join with other Pacific Islands until February 6, 1947 the Government of United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands Kingdom and France met in Canberra, Australia to setup agreement for development of Pacific Community and they established Canberra Agreement to setup South Pacific Commission, SPC. In Article 2a of that Agreement said that “The territorial scope of the Commission shall comprise all those non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Ocean which are administered by the participating Governments and which lie wholly or in part south of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea”.
Japanese has been prepared a States of Indonesia so European like Dutch could not occupied Indonesia again. Japanese has prepared Military also to support Council and they called Volunteer Army of Homeland Defense (Indonesian: Tentara Sukarela Pembela Tanah Air, PETA, (Japanese: 郷土防衛義勇軍 kyōdo bōei giyūgun?). After Japanese Japanese surrendered to Allies on September 2, 1945 on aboard of the United States Navy battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo and they leaved Indonesia but Dutch enter to Indonesia so the PETA stroke against Dutch finally Negotiations to process of federalization was initiated at a conference that took place in July 1946 at Malino, in South Celebes then continue in November 11th to November 12th, 1946 in Linggardjati on the slopes of Mt Ceremay around 25 km towards the south of the West Java city of Cirebon. The Dutch side was represented by Lieutenant General Governor Hubertus van Mook, the Indonesian side by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. Negotiations had begun in October 1946 and a ceasefire in Java and Sumatra was agreed According to the terms of the agreement, the Netherlands agreed to recognize Republican rule over Java, Sumatra and Madura. The Republic would become a constituent state of the United States of Indonesia, which would be established by 1 January 1949 at the latest and form a Netherlands-Indonesian Union together with the Netherlands, Suriname, Netherlands New Guinea and the Netherlands Antilles. The Dutch Queen would remain official head of this Union. On 25 March 1947 the Dutch House of Representatives ratified a ‘stripped down’ version of the treaty which was, however, not accepted by the Indonesians. Further disagreements rose over the implementation of the agreement. On July 20, 1947 the Dutch administration cancelled the accord and proceeded to commence military intervention in form of the Operatie Product, the first of two events known as politionele acties (‘police actions’). After the agreements surrounding the Linggardjati Agreement broke down there was a prolonged period of diplomatic dispute and open conflict in Indonesia for much of 1947 between the Dutch and Indonesian authorities. The United Nations Security Council established a Committee of Good Offices which led to the signing of the Renville Agreement in January 1948 on the USS Renville anchored off Jakarta. However the Linggardjati Agreement and the Renville Agreement were at best only partially successful. Disagreements and sharp military clashes between the Dutch and the Indonesia sides continued on throughout 1948 and until May 7, 1949 they were met between two negotiator from Indonesia Mohammad Roem and Dutch Jan Herman Van Roijen. The purpose of the meeting was to iron out outstanding issues prior to Indonesian independence which was to be granted at the Round Table Conference at The Hague later that same year.
The primary concerns that were agreed upon were:
• Indonesian armed forces to cease all guerilla activities.
• The Indonesian Republican government’s consent to attend the Round Table Conference.
• Restoration of the Indonesian Republican government in Yogyakarta.
• Dutch troops to cease all military operations and free all prisoners of war.
On June 22 another meeting took place regarding future Dutch-Indonesian relationships. The principles that were agreed upon were:
• Complete and unconditional sovereignty to be transferred to Indonesia in accordance with the Renville Agreement of 1948.
• A union to be established by the Netherlands and Indonesia on the basis of voluntary and equal partnership with equal rights.
• An agreement with regard to the transfer of the rights, powers and obligations from the Dutch East Indies to Indonesia.
On July 6, 1949 Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta returned from exile to the Indonesian Republican capital of Jogjakarta. On July 13, 1949 the Hatta cabinet confirmed the Roem – Van Roijen Agreement. On August 3, 1949 a Dutch-Indonesian ceasefire was agreed upon and came into place on Java (Aug 11) and Sumatra (Aug 15). The Round Table Conference from Aug, 23 to Nov 2, 1949 reached agreement on all issues in the agenda, with the exception of the West New Guinea question because after World War Two West New Guinea has joined with South Pacific Commission according to Canberra Agreement February 6, 1949 and also West New Guinea were not Malay peoples look like Indies peoples of Indonesia but they were Negroid Melanesian who leaved in South Pacific Ocean from Sahul Plate Continent that established Australia and New Guinea island. Hague Agreement, also called Round Table Conference Agreement or Hague Agreement, treaty ratified on November 2, 1949, between the Netherlands and the United States Republic of Indonesia but revoked by Indonesia on 17th August 1950 by changed Federal States of United States of Indonesia to Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia through Regulation No. 7 Year 1950 and changed back to Constitution 1945 in July 21th, 1956. Because of this rejection before one year later, so Dutch claimed that the Hague Agreement has been canceled by the Republic of the United States of Indonesia made after one year later Dutch never want to discussed about the Status Quo of Netherlands New Guinea like has declared in Article 2 of the Charter of Hague Agreement.
“The Status Quo of the Residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of the transfer of the sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the Question of the Political Status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and Kingdoms of Netherlands.”
It’s so clearly but Indonesia so stupid because they still claimed the Article 2 of Hague Agreement. In Round Table Conference, Indonesia tried to pushed Dutch about their territories include West New Guinea but Dutch rejected them because war can changed the line of that territories so Dutch angry and want to stop the meeting finally Indonesia delegation leader Drs. Mohammad Hatta said “Let’s West New Guinea peoples determine their future because they were not Malay peoples like us”. Thus the statement of Drs. Mohammad Hatta in Hague Agreement, then the meeting continue. After ratified Hague Agreement on November 2, 1949 so they made ceremony of the Sovereignty of Federal States of United States of Indonesia in December 27, 1949. In 12th January 1950, the representatives of Netherlands at the European Office of the United Nations at Geneva presents their compliments to the Executive Secretary of Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization that Netherlands full transferred sovereignty over the whole of the territories of the Netherlands Indies with the exception of Netherlands New Guinea to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia during a formal ceremony which was held at Amsterdam on December 27th, 1949 thereby recognizing the Republic of the United States of Indonesia as independent and sovereign state.
On April 5, 1950 Indonesia rejected the Round Table Agreement by Federal Parliament of United States of Indonesia regulation No. 11 Year 1950 then they changed Federal States of United States of Republic Indonesia to Unitary States of Republic of Indonesia. So in June 29th, 1950 Netherlands Parliament established regulation to setup West New Guinea as the part of the Province of the Kingdom of Netherlands. Thus United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/448 (V) on December 12th, 1950 to setup West New Guinea as Non-Self Governing Territory according to the United Nations Charter Article 73e for support independent of Non-Self Governing Territories. The primary contents of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/448 (V) are said that Netherlands will no longer to present a report pursuant to the Article 73 e on Indonesia with the exception of West New Guinea. So, every year start from 1950 to 1962 Dutch always report to United Nations General Assembly about Self Government for Non-Self Governing of Netherlands New Guinea or West New Guinea. The processed of Self-Government of Non-Self Governing Territory of Netherlands New Guinea continued preparation before UN General Assembly established Resolution 1514/XV year 1960 for granting independent for Non Self Governing Territories so the election of New Guinea Council in year 1959 and establishment of the members of New Guinea Council in April 5, 1960 that consist of Indigenous peoples and some Dutch peoples. New Guinea Council setup National Committee of West Papua and the Committee done the Session in October 19th, 1960 to changed the name of Netherlands New Guinea to West Papua and created National Flag of West Papua that called Morning Star Flag, Coat of Arm with the motto Honest Loyal Affectionate, National Anthem was Oh My Land Papua and the peoples name changed to West Papua peoples. The Queen accepted it so the flag and National Anthem allowed to arise in December 1, 1961.
To achieve the goal of Indonesia to occupied West New Guinea, so they changed their country to Communist in 1960s and sent their troops to West New Guinea in December 19th, 1961 after celebretation of Independent Day of West Papua in 1 December 1961. Also U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard P. Jones, waited a few days after the inauguration of USA President John. F. Kennedy inauguration in 21th January 1961 thus he submitted a broad seven-point plan on 25th January 1961 to prevent Indonesia from falling under Communist control and to win it over to the west. The Key points in his plan were the resolution of the West New Guinea (WNG) question whereby Indonesia received a promise that the territory would be reunited with Indonesia. Equally important was the creation of a personal relationship between Presidents Kennedy and Sukarno. Ater that another secret US document (see, SNIE 55 – 61) with the title Outlook In Indonesia With Special Reference to West New Guinea prepared by CIA, the Departments of State, Defence, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA made in 7 March 1961 to discussed about Prospect of Indonesia.
And it was so surprised when in 18th September 1961 UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld who prepared Independent of West Papua pursuant to Article 73e, UNGA Resolution 448/V and UNGA Resolution 1514 was killed in Congo Republic then changed by U Thant in 30th November 1961, Eventually, US President John. F. Kennedy and U Thant appointed USA diplomat Ellsworth Bunker acting as UN Secretary General U Thant diplomat to pushed Dutch to transferred the administration of West Papua to Indonesia through United Nations Temporary Executive Authority, UNTEA. The secret meeting between Dutch, USA and Indonesia met in Middleburg, Virginia on March 20th, 1962 to designed Agreement to brought it in United Nations on August 15th, 1962 so they called New York Agreement to hand over administration of Netherlands New Guinea to the Republic of Indonesia. This agreement ratified by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/1752 (XVII) dated September 21th, 1962. The primary concern of that agreement were to transferred the administration of West New Guinea from Dutch to UNTEA in October 1, 1962 and Self Determination by Indigenous Papuan according to International Practice under United Nations monitoring but in fact were not because UNTEA has transferred the administration to Indonesia in May 1, 1963 then leaved West Papua so the Self Determination was done by Indonesia under their military controlled and intimidation finally the Self Determination was done with 400s Indigenous Papuans and 600s Indonesians through Assembly not through International Practice for One Man One Vote. United Nations only sent 16 man under Ambassador Ferdinant Ortizan to monitoring the Self Determination and he reported that “the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia”. The result of this self-determination was supported by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/2504 (XXIV) dated November 19th, 1969.
When the Chairman of Decolonization DR. Marty Natalegawa from Indonesia made a Seminar of Decolonization in Bali May 2010 so they removed status of Netherlands New Guinea out from the list of Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories so 80 members removed and now only 16 members but French Polynesia or Tahiti has put back to list of Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories. Until today Indonesia never establish their regulation to setup West New Guinea as their Province but just removed all administration of West New Guinea and changed with Indonesia administration like Flag, Anthem, Coat of Arm, Military, Police, Assembly, Council, etc. It’s clear that Indonesia not processed Decolonization of West New Guinea according to Resolution A/RES/448 (V) of United Nations General Assembly, UNGA. But they continued to Recolonization of West New Guinea and also was supported by United Nations General Assembly.
On May 1st, 2017 in UN Headquarter New York, John Anari as the Leader of West Papua Liberation Organization spoke in United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues to pushed UN Special Commission on Decolonization (24th Commission) and UN General Assembly 4th Commission (Political & Decolonization) for response UN General Assembly Resolution 448/V that setup Netherlands New Guinea or West Papua as Non Self Governing Territories but failed because US Businessman interested in Mining of West Papua that now Freeport McMoran from Arizona exploited.
The Special Committee on Decolonization will hold the 2017 Caribbean Regional Seminar in Kingstown, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, from 16 to 18 May with a view to accelerating action in implementation of the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism (2011-2020).
The Seminar is held under the auspices of the Special Committee, formally known as the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (also known as the Special Committee of 24, or the “C-24”).
The theme of the 2017 Seminar is “Implementation of the Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism: the future for decolonization in the Non-Self-Governing Territories: what are the prospects?”.
There are 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories remaining under the Special Committee’s purview: American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas)*, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Guam, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Western Sahara. The administering Powers are France, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States.
Taking into consideration recent developments in the Caribbean, Pacific and elsewhere, the Seminar will review the situation with respect to the 17 Non-Self-Governing Territories, including the issue of support from various entities within the United Nations system and other organizations.
The Special Committee will consider the Seminar’s conclusions and recommendations at its June substantive session, and subsequently transmit them to the General Assembly.
Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño (Venezuela), Chairman of the Special Committee, will preside over the Seminar.
Invited participants include a Special Committee delegation comprising the Bureau and members of regional groups; United Nations Member States, including administering Powers’ representatives of the Non-Self-Governing Territories, civil society and non-governmental organizations; as well as experts.
The 29 members of the Special Committee are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Chile, China, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Grenada, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sierra Leone, Syria, Timor-Leste, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Venezuela.
The 2017 annual Secretariat working papers on each Non-Self-Governing Territory are available on the United Nations decolonization website: www.un.org/en/decolonization.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines previously hosted the Caribbean Regional Seminar on Canouan Island in 2005 and in Kingstown in 2011.
* A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).
After signature New York Agreement that was arranged by US Diplomat Elsworth Bunker was signed by Indonesia and Netherlands in United Nations Headquarter on August 15th, 1962, thus August 16th, 1962 US President John. F. Kennedy wrote Memo No. 179 to the CIA, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, The Administrator, AID, and Director USIA for Capitalize West New Guinea.
Sources: Memo No. 179 John. F. Kennedy in White House on August 16th, 1962.
America turns giving money $. 800 Trillion for Indonesia to buy Russian armament in the 1960s for Indonesia to send troops to Papua for Military Invasion on 19 December 1961 and for that reason America President John. F. Kennedy pretended urged Netherlands to received Elsworth Bunker’s Draft Agreement that was signed at UN Headquarters August 15, 1962.
We just read in the Confidential Memorandum No. 286 of White House on August 15th, 1962 after New Agreement between Dutch and Indonesia in United Nations Headquarter, New York. USA.
As we knew that Roberth. W. Kommer are member of NSC that was lead by George McBundy who appointed as the President of Ford Foundation in 1966 after he success to pushed Kennedy through Mr. Kommer.
286. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
Washington, August 15, 1962.
Without trying to count too many chickens before they’re hatched, we ought to capitalize on the WNG settlement by moving fast toward the “future fruitful cooperation” of which you spoke to Sukarno.1
Capital of the sort we’ve gained is a transitory asset to be used while it’s still good. Moreover, Indonesia is one of the truly big areas of East-West competition; having invested so much in maneuvering a WNG settlement for the express purpose of giving us leverage in this competition, we’d be foolish not to follow through.
Even on an austere basis, this will cost a good deal of money. But we’ve been allocating very little to Indonesia in comparison to the total $800 million in military aid and $640 million in economic the Bloc has committed. For FY 1962, for example, we budgeted $79 million economic aid (almost 70% PL–80) and $7.6 million in MAP.
Current planning is to move in fast with only $15 million for emergency aid to get export industries going again, plus $4 million in civic action. But this is far from what will be needed shortly. Indonesia’s economy is a mess, and it has been hinting it would like a cool $400–1,000 million from us. This is nonsense, but one current guess is that at least $250 million will be needed, along with some $80 million from IMF if the Indos accept a decent stabilization plan. We can probably find the money from AID contingency fund, MAP transfer authority, and perhaps Ex-Im Bank.
We’ll want to think long and hard before engaging on yet another major aid venture, but the game is worth the candle. Indonesia has more people, and perhaps resources, than the whole of mainland SEA. Yet its internal weakness makes it a tempting prize for Communist penetration or even parliamentary takeover. The PKI is the only strong and well-organized party (indeed the largest in Free Asia). The Soviets themselves are investing heavily. While not suggesting that we try to match them, we can’t afford not to compete for such a prize. Therefore to ensure that we move fast and think big, I urge you issue attached hortatory word.2 It only cranks up a planning exercise, so you’ll still be able to call a halt later if the package looks too big.
Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memos, Komer, 8/62. Secret.↩
After the inauguration of US President John. F. Kennedy on January 25th, 1961. The US Ambassador Mr. Jones in Jakarta, Indonesia propose to hand over Administration of West Papua or West New Guinea or Netherlands New Guinea into Communist Country of Indonesia. It’s after they found Gold and Cooper Mountain in Grasberg and Earsberg where explored by Forbes Wilson from Freeport McMoran Gold & Cooper Company in 1960.
The ambition of US to pushed Dutch to transfer Administration of West New Guinea to Indonesia rejected by Dutch because West New Guinea were the Non Self Governing Territory where established by UN General Assembly Resolution 448 (V) since December 12th, 1950. So, in April 5, 1961 New Guinea Council established and October 19th, 1961 New Guinea Council setup the State of West Papua, Coat of Arm, National Anthem, etc. In December 1st, 1961 Kingdom of Dutch accept the State of West Papua but US didn’t support. Before the General Assembly Session in September 1961, UN Secretary General Daag Hamarsjold killed in Congo then changed by U Than who support Indonesia occupied West Papua. Daag Hamarsjold were the best UN Secretary General who help the Rights of Self Determination for the Peoples of West Papua pursuant to the Article 73 and UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 but he was killed finally Dutch under pressured by John. F. Kennedy to accept the proposal of US Diplomat Elsworth Bunker who acting as U Thant Ambassador. So, Dutch accept the Proposal of Elsworth Bunker and they signed New York Agreement in UN Headquarter New York on August 15th, 1962 then Dutch transferred the administration of West Papua to United Nations Temporary Executives Authority, UNTEA in October 1st, 1962. And UNTEA transfer the administration of West Papua to Indonesia in May 1st, 1963 then preparing Referendum in 1969 but before Referendum in 1967 Freeport McMoran Gold %& Cooper Company from Arizona (USA) has signed Contract Agreement with Indonesia. So, International Practice of Referendum was changed to the System of Representatives who were chose by Indonesia Military to be the members of Assembly. Where, the Assembly consist of 600s Settler Indonesian and 400s Inhabitants peoples of West Papua who under pressured by Brigadier General Ali Murtopo. Total Representatives in Assembly were 1025 peoples and 800,000s peoples forbidden to join in that Fake Referendum. This Referendum was not done by UN but by Indonesia Military, the UN members only 16th peoples under command of Mr. Ortizan Fernando who chose by UN Secretary General U Thant. Finally the referendum in 1969 rejected independent of West Papua and accept join with Indonesia.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia
143. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
Djakarta, January 25, 1961, 4 p.m.
2154. For Secretary from Ambassador. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Time has come in my opinion when US interests demand reassessment of situation in Indonesia and review of our policy and courses of action.
US has been seriously challenged in Indonesia by Communist bloc for first time since nation freed from colonial domination of Dutch.
Result is that economic, military, psychological programs which formerly good enough, no longer can assure achievement of US minimum objective of preventing Indonesia from falling under Communist control.
US is faced with decision as I see it whether this minimum objective of sufficient importance to make necessary effort to repel Communist counter-attack now in full swing. If answer affirmative US will, as in achievement any major objective, have to pay price. Price will be higher, longer we wait.
Situation still sufficiently fluid that if positive program to meet new situation is pressed immediately, vigorously, Communists can be beaten here. Inaction unlikely to preserve status quo; on contrary it virtually certain produce deterioration our position, further Communist gains, ultimate necessity for drastic measures to avert disaster—measures we might by then be unable or unwilling to take.
I wish to propose now in broad outline seven-point program of immediate action. In subsequent communications I intend to spell out in greater detail certain parts of it.
Before suggesting program I would discuss briefly reasons why we must take action—why it is that, despite the anti-Communist position of the army, Indonesians now moving slowly but perceptibly from neutralist position to one of greater dependence on bloc.
Slightly less than year ago USSR apparently reached conclusion it could not afford have largest Asian Communist Party outside China mainland go down drain. At about that time President Eisenhower declined visit Indonesia. Khrushchev did come, and he dangled practically [Page 303]unlimited offers of economic, military aid before eyes of relatively unsophisticated Indonesians. Even more importantly he came forward with sky’s-the-limit offer of political support for satisfaction of Indonesian national claim to WNG. Perhaps most effective of all, he paid attention to Sukarno.
At almost this precise moment Dutch elected assert their colonial claim in this part of world by dispatching aircraft carrier Karel Doorman on flag-showing cruise. However innocent Dutch intent may have been, however well-grounded in legality their claims to this conglomeration of mountain and swamp land half world away, from Holland, consequences of this action have been mischievous and long-lasting. At worst, this defiant gesture may have been prelude to free world disaster in Southeast Asia, opening the way, as it has, for an unwelcome choosing up of sides over intrinsically insignificant issue.
It hardly necessary to spell this out in detail. Should war break out between Netherlands and Indonesia over WNG, consequences are such that our entire position in Asia would be threatened. The Sino-Soviet bloc would at once come to support of Indonesia, Australia would at once come to support of Holland. The US would be forced to choose between unsatisfactory position of neutrality and support of Netherlands on an issue which all of Asia and Africa would regard as struggle of new nation against colonialism.
In my view this bleak outlook can be prevented from ever coming to pass but not without US seizing initiative, difficult as this is for us in situation in which long-time, tried and true ally arrayed against uncertain newcomer. Formula for solution of WNG question must be found, US as acknowledged leader of free world has responsibility of finding it. We must further face up to hard fact that if peaceful solution to be developed it must be solution acceptable to Indonesians. Time has passed that Dutch could dictate terms and every attempt on their part to do so only throws Indonesians closer and closer into waiting Soviet arms.
Solution of West Irian problem, difficult as that may be, is, however, alone no longer sufficient to bring about readjustment of Indonesian posture. Second essential key is Sukarno the man. Once Sukarno would have turned with whole heart to US if we would have changed our position on WNG; he told at least three successive Ambassadors this. Today more is required.
We must convince Sukarno we are interested in working with him to achieve peaceful solution to problems of Asia in general and WNG in particular. As first step toward new rapprochement with Indo President, we must satisfy him that US is not hostile to him personally. Reserving elaboration of separate points for subsequent communications, following is summary of actions which I think we must take to achieve our objectives.
Resolution of New Guinea question. We must actively seek formula for solution West Irian question, exploring all possibilities, recognizing that there no possibility of permanent, peaceful settlement which does not include unmistakable promise that this territory will one day be united with Indonesia.
Establishment of personal relationship between President Kennedy and President Sukarno. This involves also recognition of fact there no group in Indonesia except rebels willing directly to oppose Sukarno, and therefore no immediate means of displacing him.
Greater flexibility in (a) technical assistance programs including commodity support; and (b) educational exchange. Only slightly more funds would be required but Ambassador should be free to move expeditiously when opportunity arises.
Much greater speed in supporting development projects and programs, more stress on political effect; willingness to let Indo use development funds as they think best, including promotion of their concept of socialist state if necessary; and broader use of resources for development of impact projects on basis of calculated risk even though such use funds may involve some departure from traditional economic criteria for justification.
Removal of political restrictions, “token aid” character military assistance to Indo. For example, provision heavier weapons rather than permitting bloc to supply them (although we may be too late here).
Preparation for possible major psychological war campaign coordinating covert and overt resources when proper climate can be developed.
Review of US position colonial questions throughout world, to assure that we are as we talk and as we like to think of ourselves. Although listed last in this list, it might well be first in importance.
It my considered judgment that such program would not meet our short range objective here. I believe, however, that its success depends upon complete coordinated pursuit of all seven points. Partial implementation would not likely bring partial success but only delayed failure.
If it is to be argued as heretofore that such program involves too high price, then we must readjust our thinking to concept of advanced Communist base in this three thousand [garble], strategically located treasure house of resources, or at least an Indonesia closely approximating Communist satellite. We may even have to face involvement in new proxy war or war itself should Anzus become involved over WNG.
It not my purpose to evaluate these possibilities in total scheme of things. I consider it my inescapable duty, however, to point the ways I see of avoiding them.
The Government of Indonesia doesn’t received the Political Status of West Papua After the chairman of West Papua Liberation Organizatio (WPLO), John Anari spoke in the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) at 10.00 am to 1.00 pm 17 May 2016 at UN Headquarter in New York about the involvement of USA, UN and Indonesia by removing West Papua or Netherlands New Guinea from the List of Non Self Governing Territories without processing UN General Assembly Resolution 448 (V) and UN Charter Article 73 e also UN General Assembly Resolution 1514.
Statement by Indonesia Government and John Anari in this link below:
Chairperson of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
Ladies and Gentlemen
My name is John Anari. I am the Leader of West Papua Liberation Organization (WPLO). On behalf of the WPLO, I offer my heartfelt thanks to the Permanent Forum for giving me this opportunity to address this Forum.
For benefit of the people of West Papuan, I and the West Papuan Liberation Organization am asking this Forum to understand both the cause of the conflict which we are suffering, and the solution which the Economic and Social Council can provide for West Papua.
Most States that come into conflict with an indigenous community, do so because the community has land or resources that the State wants. Unfortunately, West Papua had the misfortune of having gold and other minerals that certain American businessmen wanted.
Twenty years ago a Mr Stanton introduced the concept of eight stages of genocide, eight steps which can condition a society to commit genocide. But I submit, that for indigenous communities there are normally only two stages; greed and deception.
Greed is the motive, and deception includes all the lies that allege that an indigenous people are less entitled to their homes and to their lives. Nobody can prevent greed, but the deceptions can be fought with education and public awareness of the humanity of the indigenous communities.
If each of the oppressed indigenous communities had use of equipment and access to an independent media channel, the ascendancy of oppressive States might be peacefully reduced.
Even a small deception can cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
For fifty four years West Papua has been the victim of such a deception, a deception at the United Nations alleging that the reporting of the progress of the colony could be exercised by the General Secretary U Thant instead of the Trusteeship Council as is required by the Charter of the United Nations.
This is a deception which the Economic and Social Council can end this year by putting the issue of West Papua on the agenda of the Trusteeship Council as should have been done in 1962.
The indigenous people of West Papua are no less deserving than other people of the protection promised by the Charter of the United Nations, so I again ask that this Forum recommend to the Economic and Social Council that it put the international issue of General Assembly resolution 1752 on the agenda of the Trusteeship Council as should have been done in 1962.
I wish to explain briefly how West Papua become the subject of General Assembly resolution 1752. I will continue using the name West Papua for my homeland although the United Nations during the 1960s used titled including Netherlands New Guinea, West New Guinea, and West Irian.
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, West Papua permitted a Dutch presence, and in December 1950 the United Nations in General Assembly Resolution 448 (V) agreed that the Netherlands owed an obligation to respect West Papua’s cultural, political, economic, and other rights.
But in 1959 a Mr John Henderson proposed that the United States could use an United Nations trusteeship to transfer the administration of West Papua to the United Nations and then to the Republic of Indonesia. And by March 1961 the United States believed that Indonesia on condition that the trusteeship would not be called a trusteeship, would support the American plan for United Nations trusteeship of West Papua.
The Dutch tried to evade the American ambition in 1961 by asking the General Assembly to approve a normal United Nations trusteeship of West Papua, unfortunately the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold was killed on 18th September 1961; eight days before the Assembly’s vote. And without the assistance of Hammarskjold’s advice, the bid for a trusteeship that would have been reported to the Trusteeship Council failed.
In December 1961 the Republic of Indonesia began a small or token invasion of West Papua, after which the United States began negotiations asking the Netherlands to sign the United Nations trusteeship agreement which the United States and then Indonesia had been preparing since 1959.
Indonesia released an American pilot Mr Allen Pope in July 1962, and the agreement asking the General Assembly to approve an United Nations occupation and administration of West Papua was signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia on the 15th August 1962. On the next day, 16th August 1962, the New York Times published a public endorsement by the new Secretary General proclaiming the benefits of the agreement which had just been signed by the Netherlands and Indonesia.
A month later a draft text for a General Assembly resolution was presented to the United Nations membership on the day before they were asked without a debate to vote on the agreement asking the United Nations to occupy and administrate West Papua. The government of Benin (Dahomey) then expressed outrage that the people of West Papua had not been consulted and that the agreement did not require that the indigenous people of West Papua be permitted to have a referendum. The government of Togo deplored the “haste” of the vote and the lack of time the UN members had to read the text of the agreement. And three days later the government of Senegal asked to change the record of its vote from affirmative to negative.
Despite the haste of the vote, the General Assembly approved the agreement and ten days later on the 1st October 1962 the United Nations took over the administration of West Papua.
Please understand, although US records assert that Indonesia did not want to call the trusteeship a trusteeship; that the first line of the 1962 agreement refers to the trusteeship relationship by saying that the purpose of the agreement is the “interests and welfare of the people of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian)”
In addition to the agreement, the physical act of occupying West Papua also placed the United Nations into the position of a trustee administrating the territory for benefit of the people of West Papua. And that event should also have been reported to the Trusteeship Council by means of the agenda of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with article 85 part 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
I also remind this Forum and remind the Economic and Social Council that article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations does not permit any obligation of the Charter to be mitigated or voided by any agreement. Therefore the request in the 1962 agreement asking the Secretary General receive and distribute information about West Papua, does not extinguish the obligation of the United Nations described in article 85 part 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is article 85 part 2 of the Charter of the United Nations that entitles West Papua to make this request for this Forum to recommend to the Economic and Social Council that it put the international issue of General Assembly resolution 1752 on the agenda of the Trusteeship Council.
Any debate about the Charter of the United Nations obligations is in the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) from whom the Trusteeship Council will be asking for an advisory opinion once the issue of General Assembly resolution 171 and General Assembly resolution 1752 are put on the Council’s agenda as should have been done in September 1962.
In the name of the Lord, I would like to thank you.
UN Headquarter, New York. May 17th, 2016
 Genocide Watch briefing paper to the US Department of State in 1996 http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html
 General Assembly. 1950. Development of self-government in Non-Self-Governing Territories. New York. Agenda Item 320 on 12th December 1950. http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/448(V)
 US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII. 203 Despatch from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State. A Proposal for settlement of the West New Guinea Dispute. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v17/d203
 US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXIII. 150. Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d150
 Kahin & Khan (1997) . Subversion as Foreign Policy The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. ISBN 0-295-97618-7.
 1962 United Nations Yearbook Part 1 Sec 1 Chapter 9, page 125
 Online copy available http://wpik.org/Src/NYT/19620816_statements.pdf
 General Assembly 1127th Plenary meeting paragraphs 170-197.
 General Assembly 1127th Plenary meeting paragraphs 242-246.
 General Assembly 1127th Plenary meeting paragraphs 263-266.
 1962 United Nations Yearbook Part 1 Sec 1 Chapter 9, page 127
 1962 United Nations documentary reference A/5169
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
23 May 1962
LETTER DATED 22 MAY 1962 FHOM THE ACTING SECHETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO TEE PRIME MINISTER OF NETHERLANDS
This is to acknowledge your letter of 16 May 1962 relating to the situation in and around West New Guines. As you know, I have been myself concerned. about developments in the area and have, on a number of occasions, appealed to all parties involved to exercise the utmost restraint. This would seem to be even more desirable now that, with my encouragement, Ambassador Bunker is engaged in attempts to bring the parties together with a view, to finding a solution for the difficulties that have arisen.
Your suggestion that I now approach the Government of Indonesia with an appeal would, if accepted by me, imply that I was taking sides in the controversy, which I believe would not be in the best interest of all concerned.
I feel, however, that a situation has arisen where it appears appropriate to appeal, both to your Government and that of the Republic of Indonesia, to refrain from all aggressive action, both in view of the obligations of the two Governments under the Charter and in order not to jeopardize the efforts that are now being made by Ambassador Bunker.
With regard to your second suggestion, namely to send some observe to the region to take note of the factual situation and to act as a stabilizing factor, I would like to inform you that I could consider such a move only if a request were made by both the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments. In any other circumstances I believe that such action on my part would not be appropriate.
Accept, Sir, etc.